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ARTICLES

CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND ABORTION POLICY: CAN GOVERNMENT
BE BOTH PRO-CHOICE AND ANTI-ABORTION?*
James R. Bowers** with Ummuhan Turgut***
I. INTRODUCTION
Organized reaction to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services1 and Rust v. Sullivan2 strongly suggests that abortion remains a "clash of absolutes." It
is a clash between the fetal-being's life and a woman's liberty interest
in the abortion decision; a decision that may be essential to her physical, psychological, and economic self-preservation. Defined in this manner, the abortion controversy routinely leads government decision-makers to formulate and implement abortion policy reflecting these two
-polar positions. Abortion policy rarely seems to strive for some middle
position or common ground between opposing viewpoints. Must abortion present government decision-makers with this seemingly unresolvable clash of absolutes; or, can government decision-makers somehow
blend together the pro-choice and anti-abortion positions in a way that
simultaneously respects a woman's private moral choice and the fetalbeing's life? In short, can government be both pro-choice and antiabortion?

An earlier version of the article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association and the Annual Meeting of the Association for Politics and the Life
Sciences, Washington, D.C., August 29-September 1,1991.
** Ph.D. Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL. Assistant Professor of Political Science,
St. John Fisher College, Rochester, NY.
*** B.A. St. John Fisher College, Rochester, NY. First year law student lIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law, Chicago, IL.
1. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
2. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (interim ed. 1991).
3. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE. ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
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We believe that the answer to the above question is yes. Government can be both pro-choice and anti-abortion. To do so, however, requires a theoretical framework capable of guiding and directing abortion policy. It must be this theoretical framework that balances aspects
of both the pro-choice and anti-abortion positions. More importantly, it
must provide this balance in a manner faithful to this nation's constitutional heritage. The purpose of this article is to develop such a balanced approach to abortion policy. To pursue this goal, we present a
preliminary, theoretical framework that demonstrates how government
decision-makers can be both pro-choice and anti-abortion.
The classical liberal tradition of the Constitution is the foundation
on which we build our framework for abortion policy. We contend that
classical liberalism prohibits government from interfering with individuals' choices made in the private sphere of their lives unless this interference is necessary to reaffirm natural rights. We also contend that the
abortion decision resides in this private sphere. Locating the abortion
decision here effectively means government has no alternative but to be
pro-choice in so far as pro-choice means prohibiting an outright ban on
abortion or other governmental actions designed to coerce women into
not having abortions.
If government has no constitutional alternative but to be prochoice, how can it also be anti-abortion? Our position is that although
classical liberalism prohibits government from directly interfering with
choices made in the private sphere, it allows government to use noncoercive means to try and influence these choices. In regard to abortion
policy, government can choose to be anti-abortion by pursuing programs that encourage, give incentives for, or enable women experiencing unwanted pregnancies to choose parenthood or adoption over abortion. Through this approach, government functions within the
Constitution's tradition of classical liberalism while still promoting its
favored position on abortion.
This article sets forth our theoretical framework which is divided
into two parts. Part II presents an overview of classical liberalism and
shows the importance of this theory of government to this nation's constitutional thought. Part III applies the principles of classical liberalism
to the abortion controversy. It discusses the nature of the liberty interest in the abortion decision as understood through classical liberalism.
Part II also examines how government, by being faithful to the principles of this theory, can be both pro-choice and anti-abortion.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/2
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II.
A.

CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION

An Overview of Classical Liberalism

In his Roe v. Wade4 concurrence, Justice Potter Stewart wrote:
"In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed . .

.

. [T]he 'liberty' pro-

tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers
more than those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights." 5 The
broad conception of the liberty interests protected by the Constitution
espoused by Justice Stewart in his Roe concurrence reflected a classical
liberal understanding of liberty, an understanding deeply ingrained in
this nation's constitutional thought.
Classical liberalism is a natural law theory of government in which
individuals and their liberties are superior to and take precedence over
government. 6 A major assumption of classical liberalism is that prior to
entering into a political community, individuals reside in a state of nature. A state of nature is a state of perfect and total freedom in which
individuals can "order their actions, and dispose of their possessions
and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature,
without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man."'
Though individuals enjoy perfect freedom and equality in a state of
nature, this liberty is unsafe and unsecured. It is open to invasion by
other individuals willing to violate the law of nature." To make their
liberty more secure from invasion, individuals voluntarily consent to
create government and enter into a political community. Specifically,
individuals constitute government to: provide established, settled, and
known laws that can be applied against those who would invade another individual's liberty; establish known and indifferent judges to apply the community's laws; and establish the power to enforce the application of the community's laws.' In so doing, individuals do not lose
liberty in forming government. Rather, individuals only surrender the
powers to judge those who have invaded their liberty and to punish
them for the crimes they have committed."
Classical liberalism correctly recognizes that individuals form government to better secure the total, yet unsecured, liberty they enjoy in
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Id.at 168.
6. JAMES A. CURRY, RICHARD B.

RILEY & RICHARD M. BATTISTONI, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 21-22 (1989) [hereinafter CURRY].

7. JOHN LOCKE,
(1690).
8. Id.§ 123.

SECOND TREATISE

9. Id.§§ 124-26.
Id.§ 128.
Published 10.
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a state of nature. For if government was to exercise absolute or unrestrained power, it would be as great a threat to liberty as existing unprotected in a state of nature. Classical liberalism guards against this
possibility by maintaining that individuals cannot consent to absolute
government, that under the law of nature there are some things to
which individuals cannot consent."
A man .. .cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another;
and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty,
or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him
for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he
doth, or can give up to the common-wealth, and by it to the legislative
power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power
• . .is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath
no end but preservation. 2
This prohibition on unlimited consent serves to protect individuals
from absolute government. Consent limits government to those powers
enumerated to it by the members of the political community, or those
powers reasonably implied through the specific grants of powers. In any
area over which government lacks delegated or implied authority, individuals retain the "right to be let alone."' 13 Consent effectively means
that "government powers are limited and specified and rendered as islands surrounded by a sea of individual rights." 4
Classical liberalism further limits government by separating legislative and executive power. To leave them combined risks the possibility that those who govern will use their authority for their own advantage rather than in the interest of the political community.' 5 Classical
liberalism limits government further by retaining in the individuals the
right to dissolve the existing government or rebel against it when it fails
to secure their liberty, or when it violates the liberty it was created to
secure. 6 By limiting government through these mechanisms, classical
liberalism establishes that even though individuals create government
to secure liberty, they surrender little of that liberty through the act of
forming government. To the contrary, "every civil right.grows out of a
natural right; or in other words, is a natural right exchanged.""'

11. Gary D. Glenn, Xenophon's Hiero and "Limited Government", in POLITIKOS 60-77,
188-91, at 96 (K. Moors ed. 1989).
12. LOCKE, supra note 7, § 135.
13. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 445 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14. STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSITUTION 32 (1987).
.15. LOCKE, supra note 7, § 143.
16. Id. §§ 211-43.
17. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 69 (Penguin Books 1969) (1791).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/2
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Growing from its prohibition on unlimited consent and the requirement of limited government, classical liberalism also "distinguishes between the public and private sphere of life." It recognizes that "some
areas of human life are by right beyond the scope of government's coercive power;" that the coercive power of government "may surround and
protect but may not penetrate" the liberty of those in whose name it
governs.1 8 In the private sphere individuals are free to indulge in
whatever passions and pleasures they so desire. For according to classical liberalism, individuals have "an absolute right to . . .self preservation, including the right to determine the means to it." 1 9 What can be
done in the private sphere, then, is limited only by the natural law
against self-destruction. For example, in the private sphere individuals
are free to indulge in unlimited sexual desire." Dissenting in Bowers v.
Hardwick,2 1 Justice Blackmun captured the classical liberal recognition
of the two spheres of human lives:
Statutes banning public sexual activities are entirely consistent with protecting the individual's liberty interest in decisions concerning sexual relations: the same recognition that those decisions are intensely private
which justifies protecting them from government interference can justify
protecting individuals from unwilling exposure to the sexual activities of
others . . . .[T]he mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere
to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest, let alone an
interest that can justify invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live their lives differently.2
As Blackmun's dissent in Bowers suggests, government cannot
generally impose behavior on individuals if the actions it seeks to control reside in the private sphere. To do so is to deprive individuals of
their liberty. 3 Rather than control the private sphere, the original and
only task of government is to surround and protect the choices made
within it.24 Indeed, a principal reason why individuals consent to having
their public lives regulated by government is to remain free in their
private lives. Properly understood, then, government is limited to regulating the public sphere of human life. Government can only intrude
into the private sphere when such actions are necessary to reaffirm natural rights. Government can intrude into the private sphere to prohibit

18. Glenn, supra note 11, at 61.
19. Gary D. Glenn, Inalienable Rights and Positive Government in the Modern World, 41J.
POL. 1057, 1064 (1979).
20. Glenn, supra note I1,at 189.
21. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
22. Id. at 212-13.
23. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 121-22 (1969).
Glenn, supra 1991
note 11, at 61-63, 75.
Published 24.
by eCommons,
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individuals from invading another's liberty. Government can also intrude into the private sphere when such actions are necessary to prevent individuals from violating the natural law against self-destruction,
thereby reaffirming the natural right of self-preservation. With these
person belongs
exceptions, government must otherwise accept that 2"a
5
whole."
a
as
society
or
others
to
not
and
to himself
In distinguishing between the public ahd private sphere of human
life, classical liberalism implicitly recognizes that in the private sphere
individuals are morally autonomous." To claim individuals are morally
autonomous is to assume that they are capable of using reason to know
the law of nature; how that law applies to them; how it defines their
relationships with other individuals; and the consequences for violating
the law of nature. It is a recognition that within the private sphere of
their different lives "intelligent, reasonable persons can and do pursue
widely divergent personal goals and projects. '2 7 It is a respect for
moral diversity based upon the "dignity of beings with the capacity for
reflective and responsible choice." 2

Recognition of the private sphere of human life and the moral autonomy within it helps to define liberty in a political community. In a
political community, liberty is the freedom "to follow [one's] own will

in all things, where the rules prescribe not; and not to be subject to the
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man."'29 It is
the freedom of the individual "to shape the most fundamental aspects
of his or her life according to the dictates of his or her informed and

conscientious judgment."3 Under this definition of liberty, individuals
or groups of individuals in a political community are free within the

private sphere "to hold and act upon [their] belief; they are even entitled to enforce their belief among their members, as long as membership is genuinely voluntary. But they are not entitled to enforce their
belief among those who dissent from it."'" To do so runs contrary to
both moral autonomy and moral pluralism.
Accordingly, government in its dealing with the private sphere
"should be modest . . . and not too intent on enforcing virtue. '3 2 It

25. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting) (citing Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
26. E.g., LOCKE, supra note 7, §§ 22, 135; Arthur Kuflik, The Inalienability of Autonomy,
13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 271, 272 (1984).
27. MACEDO, supra note 14, at 90.
28. Id.at 91.
29. LOCKE, supra note 7, § 22.
30. MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 173 (1988).
31. L. W. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 17 (1981).
32. DANIEL FELDMAN, THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 137 (1990).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/2
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should not seek to impose the moral values of some groups in the political community onto other dissenting groups. A government formed
upon the principles of classical liberalism is not to transform individuals - it is to protect them. 3 This limit on government is the "prize
and price" of liberty that classical liberalism willingly accepts.
The prize of individual liberty is that some individuals will develop their
moral capacities . . . including their capacity for wisdom, care, and their
responsibility for their own and others' welfare . . . .The price of...
liberty is that some individuals will not develop their moral capacity
.... The prize cannot be had without the price. 4
B.

Classical Liberalism and Constitutional Thought

The ideas of classical liberalism discussed above were a dominant
influence upon the political and constitutional thought of the Framers.
For example, the Declaration of Independence clearly reflected the
founding generation's acceptance of classical liberalism:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government
35

These words demonstrate the major assumptions and principles of
classical liberalism: individuals possess natural rights; individuals form
government to better secure these rights; arising from consent, government authority is by nature limited; and individuals can dissolve or rebel against government that does not secure their liberty or that violates it.
Though frequently treated in 'solation from the Constitution, the
Declaration of Independence, with its powerful articulation of classical
liberalism, provided the "rights" theory which guided the delegates at
the Constitutional Convention. 6 Indeed, "those who framed the United
States Constitution were committed to the idea of rights as expressed

33. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
13 (1990).
34. Kimberly Sharron Dunn, The Prize and the Price of Individual Agency: Another Per-.
spective on Abortion and Liberal Government, 1990 DUKE LJ.81, 87 (1990).

35.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE PARA. 2 (U.S.
AGE OF RIGHTS 84 (1990).

Louis HENKIN.
THE
Published 36.
by eCommons,
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in the Declaration of Independence." 3 7 In fact, the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates can be understood as acts dissolving one government unable to secure liberty and replacing it with one
better able to do so. In short, the Constitutional Convention can be
interpreted as a practical application of classical liberalism.
This practical application of classical liberalism was evident
throughout the Constitutional Convention. This was particularly true in
the Framers' concern for liberty and limited government. For example,
George Mason, in explaining to the convention his opposition to the
proposed constitution, invoked the classical liberal theme of limits. According to Mason, what the new government proposed by the new constitution was not limited enough because there was "no declaration of
any kind, for preserving the liberty of the press, or the trial by jury in
civil causes; nor against the danger of standing armies in time of
peace." 8
The concern for limits was also evident during the debate over ratification. In setting forth their respective positions, both the Federalists
and the Anti-Federalists accepted the fundamental coriectness of limited government. Both agreed that government is "properly directed to
the pursuit of limited ends, namely the security of individual rights;
and there was very little debate about limited government in this fundamental sense." 39 Take, for instance, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions regarding the necessity of a bill of rights. The debate over
a bill of rights was mainly "an extension of the general debate over the
nature of limited government. ' 40 In this debate, both sides claimed the
greater allegiance to the principle of limited government. For example,
the Anti-Federalists claimed that to truly limit the new national government the proposed constitution needed a bill of rights. In rebuttal,
Federalists argued that a need for a bill of rights was preempted by the
limited nature of the powers assigned to the new central government;41
that "in strictness sense, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no need of particular reservations."" 2
The Framers also embraced the classical liberal distinction between the public and private sphere of human life. They particularly

37. Id. at 112.
38. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 175
(Ralph Ketchum ed., 1986).
39. Herbert J. Storing, What The Anti-Federalists Were For, in I THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST
53 (Herbert J. Storing, ed. 1981).
40. Id. at 67.
41. MACEDO, supra note 14, at 32.
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/2
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sought to secure the sanctity of the private sphere by protecting property rights.' 3 The Framers' definition included the classical liberal understanding that every individual has a property interest in his or her
own person. 4 Their definition of property included "the property which
individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their passions, and
their faculties."' 5 This broad definition of property was the Framers'
preferred means of protecting the private sphere of life because this
right expresses what an individual might reasonably claim to belong
exclusively to himself or herself and, therefore, private.4
The dominant influence that classical liberalism had on the Framers made its way into the text of the Constitution. For example, the
preamble accepts the classical liberal requirement of consent. It also
announces, in clearly classical liberal form, that the purpose of the
Constitution is to "secure the blessing of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity."47 Beyond the preamble, the original text of the Constitution
readily embraces the major principles of classical liberalism. Most evident is the Constitution's reliance on the classical liberal principle of
limited government. This principle is incorporated into the document in
such ways as dividing power into three functionally separate branches
of government and enumerating legislative powers. The Constitution
even institutionalizes the classical liberal principle of dissolving government; though it does so in a conservative manner. Article Five establishes a peaceful means by which the national government can be modified or changed: through amendments proposed by Congress and
ratified by the states, or through a constitutional convention called for
by two-thirds of the states. The Bill of Rights is equally limiting. "The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights [is] to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities."' 8 For example, the ninth amendment, often maligned
and unfortunately rarely relied upon, is the clearest constitutional recognition that government is limited by more than just enumerated
rights. The ninth amendment provides that "there are fundamental
personal rights . . . which are protected from abridgement by the Government though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution."' 49 The
Constitution further embraces the classical liberal notion of limited
government through the broad array of liberty interests traditionally

43. See Grant B. Mindle, Liberalism. Privacy, and Autonomy, 51 J.POL. 575, 577 (1989).
44. See LOCKE, supra note 7, § 27.
45. Mindle, supra note 43, at 583 (quoting James Madison).
46. Id.
47. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
48. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
49. eCommons,
Griswold v. Connecticut,
-381 U.S. 479, 492 (1968) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Published by
1991
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protected by the word "liberty" in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. For example, in the 1897 case Allgeyer v. Louisiana50 the United States Supreme Court illuminated the vast array of
unenumerated rights limiting government actions against individuals:
The "liberty" mentioned in that amendment means, not only the right of
the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as
by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all of his faculties; to be free to use
them in all lawful ways."
Similarly in Meyer v. Nebraska,52 the Court clearly articulated a classical liberalism inspired definition of liberty. In striking down a state
law that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to children, Justice McReynolds wrote. that the liberty in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment included and protected from government interference those rights "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men." 5
To these examples, Justice Stewart's concurrence in Roe, quoted
at the start of this discussion, can be added. Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poe v. Ullman 4 also reflected a classical liberal understanding of liberty. Justice Harlan wrote that the liberty protected by the due process
clause:
is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; . . . the freedom

from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints

. . .

and which also rec-

ognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny on the states needs asserted
5
to justify their abridgment. 5

The Constitution also relies upon the classical liberal distinction
between the public and private sphere. "The Constitution embodies a
promise that a certain sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely
beyond the reach of government." 5' 6 The Constitution's protection of
property is one manifestation of the private/public distinction. The

50.
51.

165 U.S. 578 (1897).
supra note 6, at 237.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 399.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
CURRY,

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
(1986).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/2

1991]

GOVERNMENT ABORTION POLICY

unenumerated right to privacy is equally important in the Constitution's recognition of a public and private sphere.
As Justice Douglas stated in Griswold v. Connecticut,57 privacy is
a right that lies within the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments. The right to privacy protects at
least two different kinds of interests in the private sphere. "One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.""8 This is a constitutional admonishment to government
that some things remain beyond the government's control and coercive
authority. For example, in Boyd v. United States"B the Supreme Court
read the fourth and fifth amendments to apply "to all invasions on the
part of government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life." 0 The Court continued by noting that ,in government searches "it is not the breaking of doors, and the rummaging
of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense, but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
61
and private property.
As the above discussion underscores, since the founding generation
the Constitution has regularly been understood as embodying a limiting-logic that is also power-constraining. 2 Read in this manner, the
Constitution mandates that liberty be secured against government invasion through broad protection of both enumerated and unenumerated
rights. From the above discussion, it can be equally concluded that the
Constitution does not try to make a perfectly moral society as much as
it tries to prevent a bad one from occurring."3 The Constitution, with
its limiting-logic and power-constraining nature, recognizes that attempts to invade the private sphere of human life "are excessive and
often lead to monstrous immorality.""' The most apparent "immorality" is the loss of liberty.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 1147 (1991).
Id.
Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS

RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE l, 17 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
63. FELDMAN, supra note 32, at 137.

64.

Robert A. Goldwin, Of Men and Angels: A Search for Morality in the Constitution,in

THE by
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FOUNDATION
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APPLYING AND ADAPTING CLASSICAL LIBERALISM TO THE
ABORTION CONTROVERSY

A.

Assigning Abortion to the Private Sphere

The decision to abort a fetal-being belongs to the broader liberty
interest in procreation choice. Procreation liberty extends to "both the
freedom not to reproduce and the freedom to reproduce when, with
whom, and by what means one chooses." 65 This liberty clearly is "one
of the basic civil rights of man . . .fundamental to the very existence

and survival of the race." "[T]he primary responsibility for decision
in matters of childbearing" must, therefore, rest "squarely in the private sector of our society."6' 7 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any decision more private than the decision regarding child-bearing. If classical
liberalism is to afford any meaningful separation between the public
and private sphere, then, the latter must include "the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into

matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or begat a child."'6 8 Otherwise, to allow this liberty to be invaded

by government would cause "irreparable injury" to individuals with
"no redemption" available to them. 9
As a dimension of procreation liberty, the abortion decision is also
assigned to the private sphere of human life. As with the more general
procreation liberty, the private sphere would seem "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." ' 70 "It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision that

the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of
the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties. '7 1 Like the
general liberty interest in procreation choice, then, the abortion decision is clearly private and arguably essential to a woman's selfpreservation.
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or
more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision

65. John A. Robertson, Procreation Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 406 (1983).
66. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
67. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 781
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
69. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,153 (1973).
71. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Planned
Parenthood of Kansas City Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/2
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. . whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice
freely is fundamental. Any other result ... would protect inadequately
*

a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to
all.72
To conclude, therefore, that procreation decisions, including the
abortion decision, belong to the private sphere is inescapable. To conclude otherwise would make the classical liberal principle of limited
government a hollow instrument with which to prevent government
from invading the liberty it was created to secure. Since the Constitution is so heavily influenced by classical liberal principles, to similarly
conclude that the liberty interest protected by it does not include procreation liberty is to also make the Constitution an equally hollow instrument for protecting individuals against government invasions of
their rights. If the Constitution is read to allow government the authority to impose moral behavior in matters so fundamentally private as
procreation:
[Then] we might almost as well not have any law of constitutional limitations, partly because the thing is so outrageous in itself, and partly
because a constitutional law inadequate to deal with such an outrage
would be too feeble, in method and doctrine, to deal with a very great
amount of equally outrageous materials.""
It is clear from the above discussion that both abortion and the
broader liberty interest in procreation choice are and must be within
the private sphere of human life. The private nature of the abortion
decision means that it is generally beyond the reach of government control. As with any liberty interest, in the private sphere, government
may only intrude into the abortion decision when it is necessary to reaffirm natural rights. Assigning the abortion decision to the private
sphere effectively requires government to be pro-choice in so far as prochoice means prohibiting an outright ban on abortions or other governmental interference designed to coerce women into not having abortions. As with other liberty interests, the government's function is not
to transform women but to protect them so they can freely exercise
their liberty interest in the abortion decision.
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The Nature of Abortion Liberty Under Classical Liberalism
As we discussed above, our understanding of classical liberalism
extends a liberty interest to the abortion decision. The liberty of classical liberalism, however, is not absolute. It is not a state of license "for
every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied to
any laws. ' ' 7 ' Rather, liberty is always limited by the law of nature. The
state of nature, from which all liberty is derived, "has a law of nature
76
to govern it, which obliges every one."
With its classical liberal roots, the Constitution has traditionally
been read and interpreted as incorporating this distinction between liberty and license:
B.

The liberty secured by the Constitution . . .to every person within its
jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all
times and in all circumstances, wholly free from restraint .... Real
liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which
recognized the right of each individual person to use his76own [liberty]
•. .regardless of the injury that may be done to others.
This distinction is clearly evident in many of the rights secured by the
Bill of Rights. For example, amendments two and three limit the liberty they protect.7 7 The second amendment secures "the right of the
people to keep and bear arms." 7 8s But this liberty is limited by its association with "[a] well-regulated militia being necessary to the security
of a free State."7 9
Similarly, the third amendment protects individuals in the privacy
of their homes by forbidding the quartering of soldiers in private residences.8" This privacy, however, is conditional. It applies only to times
of peace. In times of war, the Constitution allows the liberty interest in
the privacy of an individual's home to be infringed. The limited nature
of liberty extends even to such fundamental rights as the freedom of
speech. As Justice Holmes wrote in Schenck v. United States,8 1 "the
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre, and causing a panic. '"82
According to a classical liberal understanding of liberty, then, a
woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision must be "a limited
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fundamental . . . right to determine whether to terminate a pregnancy ' 8a and "must be considered against important state interests in
regulation," 84 state interests that are themselves constrained by the
limiting-logic and power-constraining nature of the Constitution. To
claim more than a limited liberty interest in abortion would be license
and not liberty. It would be a claim that a woman may do with her
body as she wishes. But such a position is inconsistent with the classical
liberal prohibition on unlimited consent. If a woman had complete bodily autonomy, she would be able to alienate the most fundamental of
the inalienable rights recognized by classical liberalism, i.e., self-preservation. In so doing she would have the liberty to kill herself, enslave
herself, or have another individual enslave himself or herself to her.85
These are things that classical liberalism clearly prohibits.
C. Abortion and the Fetal-Being's Life
As the above discussion illustrated, a woman's liberty interest in
the abortion decision is limited, in part, by the natural right of selfpreservation. Her liberty interest in the abortion decision is further limited by the fetal-being's interest in life which a woman has no recourse
but to end when she chooses to affirmatively exercise her liberty interest in the abortion decision. The nature of abortion makes these two
competing interests inseverable. This is something even the strongest
advocates of procreation liberty accept and recognize. 86 The inseverability of the fetal-being's life and a woman's liberty interest in the
abortion decision will remain the issue in the abortion controversy until
such time as medical science perfects fetal transfers or other means of
preserving the life of the fetal-being. 87 Until that time, the political
community must find some balance between these two competing interests that does not overly sacrifice the one in order to secure the other.
Admittedly, classical liberalism does not directly address the right
of a fetal-being to life any more that it directly addresses a woman's
liberty interest in the abortion decision. But it is still useful as a guide
to thinking about how to balance these two clashing interests. Classical
liberalism's discussion on parental power is particularly helpful.

83. Webster v. Reprodutive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 555 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
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Classical liberalism recognizes that parents "have a sort of rule
and jurisdiction over [their children], when they come into the world,
and for some time after."8 8 This jurisdiction extends to the parents'
right to "direct their [children's] activities, care, education, health, and
religion." 89 It is also an "essential" and "basic civil right" belonging to
parents. 90 Beyond being a basic right, parental authority is also an obligation stemming from their children's inability during infancy and
their younger years to care adequately for themselves.9 1 This obligation
involves "nurturing and protecting . . .and educating [their children]
toward the ultimate goal of . . .independence and adulthood." 92
For classical liberalism, parental authority is like a "temporary
government." But it is unlike the government under which the parents
live.9" The most notable distinction is the different justifications on
which parental authority and government are based. The latter is based
upon the need of adult individuals with the power of reason to be secure in the exercise of their liberty; it is based upon consent. The state
of childhood, however, is imperfect in that children are not born to
reason and lack the capacity to freely consent. In their imperfect state,
children also "lack the experience, perspective, and judgment, to recognize and avoid choices that could be harmful to them." 94 Parental authority, then, derives "from the duty which is incumbent upon [the parents], to take care of their offspring, during the imperfect state of
childhood; to inform [children's] minds, and govern the actions of their
yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place."'9 5
Though unlike government in most respects, classical liberalism
recognizes that parental authority is very much like government in one
important sense. Rather than being absolute, parental authority, like
government, is also limited by the law of nature. Parental authority is
limited to "the help, instruction and preservation of their offspring." 96
Indeed, these obligations are "so incumbent on parents for their children's good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of [their
children]. 9 7 Parental authority does not extend, though, to the power
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of "life and death, at any time, over their children."98 Failure to abide
by the limits imposed on their authority means that parents can forfeit
that authority over their children. Parents who "quit" the care of their
children actually lose their "power over them." 99 *
Classical liberalism does not expressly say who determines when
parents have forfeited or quit their authority over their children. Nor
does it say to whom this authority is transferred. But classical liberalism does recognize some notion of forfeiture and transfer: "[Parental
authority] belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child, as
to the natural father of another."1 00
Though classical liberalism is fairly silent on this point, it would
seem that the responsibility for determining forfeiture and transfer of
parental power would rest with the government of the political community to which the parents are members. As previously noted, in a political community adult members surrender to government their authority
in a state of nature to judge and punish individuals who invade and
violate their natural rights. They do so to better protect and secure
their natural rights. It is only logical, then, that government should
provide an analogous protection from parental abuse to children. To
deny children this protection would leave them in an unsecured state of
nature far worse than that in which adult individuals found themselves
prior to forming a political community.
Classical liberalism's prohibition on parental control over the life
and death of their children and government's implied authority to respond to abuses in parental authority are particularly relevant to the
discussion of the fetal-being's interest in life, and how this interest limits a woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision. Admittedly,
classical liberalism's discussion on parental authority is intended to apply to born children: Similarly, at least since Roe v. Wade,101 the Constitution has been read to exclude the unborn. But in some respect, the
Court has not been consistent in this conclusion. Though in Roe it refused to recognize the unborn as among the persons protected by the
Constitution, in the abortion cases the Court indirectly embraces an
awareness and appreciation for the fetal-being's life. It does so by recognizing government's interest in protecting and promoting potential
life. 0 2 To apply the classical liberal understanding of parental authority to the abortion controversy, it is only necessary, therefore, to show
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at what point in its development the fetal-being resembles the "bornchild" of classical liberalism and the "born-person" of the Constitution.
The fetal-being most resembles the born-child of classical liberalism and the born-person of the Constitution at the point of viability
and throughout the post-viability stages of pregnancy. A viable fetalbeing is one that has "a reasonable potential for subsequent survival"
if it were to be removed from the uterus.1" 3 "Subsequent survival" is
also approximately the same goal of a pregnancy in which the fetalbeing goes full-term and actually becomes the born-child of classical
liberalism. Currently, viability.occurs somewhere between the 24th and
28th week of pregnancy. But with rapid advances in medical technology and changing medical interpretation, the point at which the fetalbeing becomes viable is likely to move steadily forward into earlier
weeks of pregnancy. This realistically means that as medical science
advances the point of viability, the recognition of the fetal-being's life
and its resemblance to the born-child of classical liberalism and the
born-person of the Constitution will also occur earlier in the pregnancy.
Recognizing that at the point of viability a fetal-being becomes
analogous to a born-child clearly impacts upon and limits a woman's
liberty interest in the abortion decision. Prior to viability a woman's
liberty interest in abortion remains private and absolute. But at the
point of viability and throughout the remainder of the pregnancy the
fetal-being's interest in life becomes superior to a woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision. From the point of viability, a woman is
limited in her action toward the fetal-being by the same restraints that
would be placed upon her by classical liberalism if the fetal-being was
an actual born-child. In particular, the classical liberal prohibition on
parents possessing life and death control over the child becomes operable. In short, a woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision ends at
the point in which the fetal-being becomes viable.
At the point of viability it also becomes incumbent upon government to provide protection to the fetal-being against parental abuse.
Indeed, it is only from the point of viability that government has any
legitimate interest in protecting and promoting the fetal-being's interest
in life. Prior to viability government lacks authority to use its coercive
powers on behalf of the fetal-being. But from viability onward, government is obligated to use its coercive powers to secure the fetal-being's
life by prohibiting post-viability abortions. In so doing, government acts
to assure the classical liberal notion of limited parental power.
The one exception to this general rule is post-viability abortions
necessary to save the life of the woman. It seems logical that classical
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liberalism would direct government to place greater emphasis on the
self-preservation of the woman than on a fetal-being possessing only a
reasonable potential for subsequent survival. Therefore, government
must allow for post-viability abortions that are necessary to save the
life of the mother. But in so providing, government need not surrender
all interest in the life of the fetal-being. Government can require that
once the woman's life is secured, that the physician performing the
abortion apply all acceptable and possible medical practices to save the
life of the aborted viable fetal-being. Although viability limits a woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision, from a classical liberal
perspective it is still the best point at which to recognize a fetal-being's
life for two important reasons. First, viability is a distinction made by
medical science. When viability is likely to occur can be determined on
the basis of objective medical criteria rather than on moral or religious
judgment. Using viability, then, to recognize the fetal-being's interest
in life keeps government from imposing any particular religious or
moral belief onto the political community as to when life begins.
In fact, incorporating into abortion policy any other recognition of
the fetal-being's life other than viability is impermissible under the
classical liberal prohibition on imposing moral beliefs and behavior on
those aspects of an individual's life assigned to the private sphere. 10
For example, contrary to the plurality opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,'0 5 the preamble of the Missouri statute claiming
that "the life of each human being begins at conception"'0 6 is impermissible because it imposes a moral belief on the political community, a
belief from which many dissent. As Justice Stevens wrote in dissent,
the preamble to the Missouri statute is "an unequivocal endorsement of
0 7
a religious tenet of some but by no means all faiths.'
Second, recognition of the life of the fetal-being at the point of
viability most effectively maintains a balance between the fetal-being's
interest in life and a woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision.
Viability allows for neither of these conflicting interests to be overly
sacrificed for the purpose of securing the other. Recognizing the fetalbeing's interest in life from the point of viability, while it limits a woman's liberty interest in abortion, helps to better secure this liberty interest. Distinguishing between pre-viable and viable fetal-beings establishes when a woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision is
completely a private affaii, removed from government regulation or
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control. In this way, the viability standard actually allows for greater
protection of a woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision, and in
a manner more constitutionally correct, than the current majority on
the Supreme Court would seemingly provide.
Of the current Supreme Court membership, at least Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and probably Souter appear inclined to disregard the classical liberal distinction
between the public and private sphere that the Framers clearly sought
to incorporate into the Constitution. These members of the Court appear ready to allow government to invade a woman's liberty interest in
the abortion decision regarding a pre-viable fetal-being and to force her
into carrying to full-term an unwanted pregnancy. For example, in
Webster, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that he could "not see why the
State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability."' 0 8 Similarly, Justice O'Connor
dissenting in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,10 9 noted that a government's interest in potential human
life exists throughout a woman's pregnancy.".' Also dissenting in
Thornburgh, Justice White, who along with Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented in Roe, wrote:
The governmental interest at issue [in abortion] is in protecting those
who will be citizens if their lives are not ended in the womb. The substantiality of this interest is in no way dependent on the probability that
the fetus may be capable of surviving outside the womb at any given
point in its development . . . .The State's interest is in the fetus as an
entity in itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the
point of viability . . . .Accordingly, the State's interest, if compelling
after viability, is equally compelling before viability."'
The outcome of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor's reasoning is clearly evident. For these
members of the Court there is no distinction between the private and
public sphere when a woman's liberty interest in abortion is the issue.
They would "return to the States virtually unfettered authority to control the quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-directing decision
whether to carry a fetus to term."'1 In freeing government on the pretense of protecting both pre- and post-viable fetal-beings, these members of the Supreme Court would permit an imposition upon women of
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a morality over aspects of their private lives with which many would
not agree. In so doing, they would permit government "to conscript a
woman's body and force upon her a 'distressful life and future' rather
than a life over which she has come to believe the Constitution guaranteed her some control." ' Such action is totally contrary to the fundamental principles of classical liberalism.
D.

The Abortion Decision, Negative Freedom, and Public Funding

Like the need to recognize the fetal-beings interest in life, the general negative tenor of classical liberalism further limits a woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision. Classical liberalism is chiefly concerned with those areas of life individuals are to be free from
government interference. Classical liberalism, asks the question: In
what areas "should a person be left to do or be what he is able to be,
without interference by other persons" or government?" 4 In this regard, classical liberalism is an expression of negative freedom. "Negative freedom implies that people are free to the extent that government
does not restrict preexisting ('natural')" rights." 5 It only dictates that
government may not prohibit or place obstacles in the way of individuals freely exercising their liberty. Negative freedom, however, does not
require government to assist individuals who lack the economic, intellectual, or physical capacity to fully exercise their liberty."' From the
perspective of classical liberalism, "mere incapacity" to exercise a
right" 7 or the government's unwillingness or failure to provide individuals "the means to enjoy freedom which they do not otherwise have""'
is not a lack of liberty." 9
Built upon a foundation of classical liberalism, the liberty interest
in the abortion decision, like the other liberty interests secured by the
Constitution, is, therefore, an expression of negative rather than positive freedom. It only limits government from interfering with a woman's private decision to chose whether or not to terminate an unwanted pregnancy by aborting the fetal-being. 20 It does not impose
any positive obligation on government to pay for either an elective or
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U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).

Published by eCommons, 1991

22

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:1

therapeutic abortion that a woman chooses to have. Nor does it require
that government allow abortions to be performed at publicly funded
facilities or by physicians whose salaries are paid through public
funds.1 ' Those who define the liberty interest in abortion as a positive
freedom interpret the Constitution as providing "remedies for every social and economic ill" confronting the nation.12 2 This is clearly the sentiment expressed by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Beal
v. Doe," 3 Maher v. Roe12" and Poelker v. Doe. 25
There is another world "out there," the existence of which the Court, I
suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize. And so the cancer
of poverty will continue to grow. This is a sad day for those who regard
the Constitution as a force that would serve justice to all evenhandedly
and in so doing, would better the lot of the poorest among us. 12 6
In incorrectly viewing the Constitution as a statement of positive freedom, advocates of public funding of abortion and abortion services fail
to make the classical liberal distinction between an individual's inability to fully exercise protected liberty due to natural incapacities such as
a lack of intellect or wealth and incapacities due to prohibited government interference. In the case of the liberty interest in abortion, proponents of public funding deny "the private fact of indigency" and behave as if it is governmentally imposed.1 27 They routinely speak of
government's "distressing insensitivity to the plight of impoverished
pregnant women." '2 8 They act as if government somehow conspires to
keep indigent women in their impoverished condition.
But as an expression of negative freedom, the Constitution, correctly read, means that the poverty in which indigent women find
themselves is not the responsibility of the government to remedy. Nothing in the Constitution, however, would prohibit government from
choosing this course of action if it so desired. Similarly, the Constitution neither specifically requires nor disallows government funding of
abortion or abortion services. Rather, it assigns that determination to
the legislative branch of government. "Indeed, when an issue involves
policy choices as sensitive as those implicated by the public funding of
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. . . abortion, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature.""' If government chooses not to publicly fund
abortion and abortion services, indigent women remain "as before, to
be dependent on private sources for the service" they desire.' 3 0
While this conclusion appears insensitive toward the plight of indigent women, to conclude otherwise would be contrary to the classical
liberal foundation on which the Constitution is largely built. As our
earlier discussion demonstrates, the Constitution is an expression of
negative freedoms limiting what actions government may take against
individual liberty. It is silent in regard to any positive obligations on
the part of government to assist individuals in the actual exercise of
their liberty. To conclude that the Constitution requires positive action
on the part of government to guarantee indigent women access to abortion and abortion services would require similar conclusions regarding
other liberty interests; conclusions which when thoughtfully considered
would appear quite ludicrous. For example, the constitutionally protected right to privacy allows individuals to read pornography in the
freedom of their home. But no one would seriously argue that the government is obligated to provide impoverished individuals with a readily
available supply of pornographic materials so that they can exercise
this liberty interest to the fullest.''
Similarly, under the Constitution, individuals enjoy the freedom of
speech. During election years many individuals exercise this liberty in
support of some candidates and in opposition to others. But some individuals of greater wealth may contribute large sums of money to their
favorite candidates or political parties. Some individuals of great
wealth may even pay for television commercials to express their opposition to particular candidates. These individuals clearly are more fully
able *to exercise their freedom of expression than persons of lesser
means who find themselves limited in their expression to placing a candidate's placard in their front lawns. But no one would seriously contend that the Constitution requires government to provide these less
well-off individuals with public funds so that they can exercise their
liberty interest in speech at the same level as more wealthy individuals.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not agree that the government's
unwillingness to assist individuals in exercising their liberty interest in
the abortion decision is "good" public policy. To the contrary, we believe it is wrong; that in many instances it will create a multi-tier system where an individual's ability to fully exercise protected liberty is
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largely dependent upon the economic strata to which they belong.
Though we disagree with the policy implications of this conclusion, the
understanding of classical liberalism articulated throughout this article,
and the Constitution's own indebtedness to this theory of government,
allows no other logical conclusion. To conclude otherwise, we would
have to read our own social and economic theory into the document.
Recalling Justice Holmes' admonishment to the Court in Lochner v.
New York,' 32 this is something we are unwilling to do. In Lochner,
Justice Holmes, reacting to the Court's majority's attempt to read laissez faire capitalism into the -Constitution, strongly admonished his
brethren by correctly observing that the "Constitution is not intended
to embody a particular economic theory. ' 133 Filled with the good intention of eliminating an inequitable situation for indigent women, those
who incorrectly impose a positive reading onto the Constitution, would
likewise read their own economic and social theory into the Constitution. But rather than the laissez faire capitalism rebuked by Justice
Holmes, proponents of public funding for abortions and abortion services would read the social-economic theory of the welfare state into
the Constitution. But the Constitution today no more enacts Michael
Harrington's The Other America"" than it did Herbert Spencer's Social Statics'3 5 during the'days of Justice Holmes.
E. Being Both Pro-Choice and Anti-Abortion
The previous discussions show that in distinguishing between the
private and public sphere of human life, classical liberalism effectively
denies government the authority to use its coercive powers to impose
behavior over otherwise morally autonomous individuals unless its actions are necessary for reaffirming natural rights. It is the assignment
of the abortion decision to the private sphere that effectively requires
government to be pro-choice in regard to pre-viability abortions. A
classical liberal interpretation of the abortion controversy means that
prior to the fetal-being's viability, women must be able to exercise their
liberty interest in the abortion decision free from direct government
efforts designed to invade this private moral decision and coerce them
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into foregoing the abortion option to unwanted pregnancies. This position holds even if women in exercising their liberty interest in the abortion decision make choices that a majority in the political community
regard as immoral.
Assigning the abortion decision to the private sphere means that
government is prohibited from imposing the political communities'
'moral view upon those women experiencing unwanted pregnancies. It is
a recognition that no woman "should be compelled to surrender the
freedom to make [the abortion] decision for herself simply because her
'value preferences' are not shared by the majority."1 36 Rather, "it is far
better to permit some individuals to make incorrect decisions than to
deny all individuals the right to make decisions that have [a] profound
effect upon their destiny."'3 7 This is the "prize and price" of liberty
mentioned earlier.
To impose an anti-abortion morality on women experiencing unwanted pregnancies would clearly violate their liberty to be free from
external compulsion to shape the fundamental aspects of their lives. In
particular, coerced moral behavior on abortion would cause women to
accept "substantial, prolonged sacrifices in another's behalf."'3 8 A woman forced into "giving her body and its resources to the development
of another body, makes a sacrifice that takes its toll on her physical,
emotional, and often financial, health during pregnancy and afterward." 39 This forced or coerced sacrifice would be tantamount to temporary slavery in that it makes the fetal-being master over the woman
in whose womb it resides.
Classical liberalism does not allow this or any other kind of enslavement. 40 As previously discussed, government under classical liberalism is based upon consent. But individuals cannot consent to things
over which they have no power. Government, therefore, can possess no
greater authority over individuals than they possess over themselves.
One area over which individuals have no control is the taking of their
own life. By this prohibition, individuals cannot consent to enslave
themselves to anyone, or to put themselves under the absolute and arbitrary powers of another. 4 ' Since individuals cannot consent to be enslaved, government also lacks the authority to enslave them, either permanently or temporarily, to it or to other individuals, including fetalbeings.
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Despite the pro-choice position pressed upon government by a
classical liberal understanding of the liberty interest in the abortion decision, government still retains the ability to be anti-abortion if it so
chooses. It is under no constitutional mandate to be neutral. As incorporated into the Constitution, the classical liberal prohibition against
government invasion of the private sphere only prohibits government
from coercing or imposing its endorsed choice on otherwise autonomous
individuals. Under the Constitution, government can legitimately seek
to influence the choices individuals make in the private sphere through
noncoercive means such as funding programs that promote the government's position and not funding those that do not. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed in Rust v. Sullivan:1 42
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund
a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with problems in another way. In so doing, the Government
has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to
fund [and promote] one activity to the exclusion of the other. 143
Specifically, in regard to the liberty interest in the abortion decision, the Constitution leaves government the discretion to decide
whether it will be more pro-choice than the minimal expectation imposed by classical liberalism or whether it will merely retain this minimal requirement and actively pursue permissible anti-abortion activities. For example, to be more actively pro-choice than the Constitution
requires, government could "constitutionally declare that . . . it will
pay the full cost of abortions for all pregnant women who are eligible
for Medicaid, but that Medicaid will no longer pay any cost related to
childbirth."1 44 The government could also maintain only the minimally
required pro-choice protection and pursue an aggressive anti-abortion
position so long as its actions were directed merely at influencing and
not coercing or prohibiting a woman's private decision whether to abort
the fetal-being.
Properly understood, then, the Constitution "implies no limitation
on the authority of [government] to make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment" by designing programs to influence the decisions women make regrading abortion. 45 When government chooses to promote alternatives to unwanted
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pregnancies other than abortion, it places no governmental obstacle in
the path of a woman who chooses to ignore governmental influence and
still invoke her private decision to abort the fetal-being. 146 Rather, it
only promotes alternative choices that it believes may be in the best
interest of the political community and of the women confronting .the
147
abortion decision.
Admittedly, this conclusion gives government a great deal of leeway in how it goes about pursuing its anti-abortion position. First,
based upon the previous discussion on the fetal-being's life, government
is obligated to prohibit most post-viability abortions. Second, government can be anti-abortion by choosing not to fund abortions or abortion
facilities. Government could also choose to launch a media campaign
against abortion through public service announcements much like it already does in its efforts against drugs and drunk driving. Government
could further pursue a more positive anti-abortion strategy by formulating and implementing a comprehensive family policy designed, in
part but not exclusively, to make parenting and adoption a more attractive solution to women facing unwanted pregnancies and to eliminate
or control the causes of unwanted pregnancies that eventually lead to
abortions. Regardless of the types of anti-abortion public programs
government pursues, if it chooses to be anti-abortion, government remains within the limits imposed upon it by classical liberalism as long
as these programs do not include using its coercive power to impose an
anti-abortion morality on women.
Applying classical liberalism to the abortion controversy, therefore, allows government to design an abortion policy that is both prochoice and anti-abortion. The former is constitutionally required in any
abortion policy. The latter is constitutionally permissible within the
limits spelled out in our discussion. In regard to being anti-abortion,
the criteria for judging the permissibility of government actions touching upon the abortion decision is the degree to which these actions are
necessary to reaffirm both the enumerated and unenumerated liberty
interests the Constitution was designed to secure. Before taking any
direct action against the abortion decision, government must first ask
itself if the proposed action is necessary to ensure that a woman's life is
not at risk during the abortion procedure. Second, government must
consider if its actions are necessary to secure the viable fetal-being's
interest in life. If the government answers no to these questions, it must
refrain from acting against the liberty interest in the abortion decision.
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If government is considering an anti-abortion policy toward previability abortion, it must ask itself whether its proposed actions directly or indirectly impede a woman's ability to freely make the abortion decision by intentionally or unintentionally coercing her to forego
having an abortion and carrying the fetal-being full-term. If government answers yes to this question, it cannot go forward with its antiabortion policy as formulated. It must find a noncoercive way of
achieving its anti-abortion goal. In responding to legal challenges to
government actions affecting the abortion decision, the courts would
apply these same criteria.
For example, if our formulation of the liberty interest in the abortion decision is applied to the Department of Health and Human Services regulations banning abortion counseling in programs receiving Title X funds under the Public Health Service Act recently upheld in
Rust v. Sullivan,1 48 they would be constitutionally impermissible. First,
these regulations are, not necessary to secure the self-preservation of
women undergoing abortions. Nor are they necessary to secure the liberty interest in life of post-viability fetal-beings. Second, by distorting
and removing important and relevant information from women dependent on Title X funded health clinics, these regulations promote the
Department of Health and Human Services anti-abortion position by
coercing rather than merely influencing a woman into foregoing abortions and carrying the fetal-being to full-term. As Justice Blackmun
observed in his Rust dissent:
The [woman's] right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if
[she] possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice ....
By suppressing medicaily pertinent information and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to consideration of [her] health, the
Government places formidable obstacles in the path of Title X clients'
freedom of choice . . . .Both the purpose and the result of the challenged Regulations is to deny women the ability voluntarily to decide
their procreation destiny. For these women, the Government will have
obliterated the freedom to choose as surely as if it banned abortions outright. The denial of this freedom is . . .a consequence . . . of Government's ill-intentioned distortion of the information it has chosen to
1 49
provide.
Although under our formulation of the liberty interest in the abortion decision the Department of Health and Human Services regulation
reviewed in Rust would be unconstitutional, all regulations pertaining
to abortion counseling in publicly funded health clinics are not prima
facie invalid. Regulations that merely seek to influence a woman's
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abortion decision by requiring the government's anti-abortion position
to be among the information presented to women seeking abortion
counseling would be permissible. Such regulations would not intentionally mislead women seeking this counseling to believe that the antiabortion position was the clinics' positions. Rather, the government's
anti-abortion position would merely be one view included as part of the
total information women receive. They would be free to accept or reject
the government's position in the attempt to make an informed decision
on how to exercise their liberty interest in the abortion decision.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this article we have tried to develop a theoretical framework for
abortion policy that demonstrates to policy-makers how they can be
both pro-choice and anti-abortion, if they so choose. We have also tried
to develop a framework.that is both firmly rooted in this nation's constitutional tradition of classical liberalism and provides substantial protection for a woman's liberty interest in the abortion decision. To these
ends, we.have argued that from a classical liberal perspective government hds no alternative but to be pro-choice in regard to pre-viability
abortions insofar as pro-choice means prohibiting an outright ban on
pre-viability abortions and other government actions intended to coerce
a woman into carrying an unwanted pregnancy to full-term. In regard
to a permissible abortion policy, the Constitution requires no more
from government and it will settle for no less. We have additionally
argued, that the classical liberal tradition of the Constitution supports
the necessity for government to also be minimally anti-abortion in order to protect a post-viability fetal-being's interest in life. Beyond these
minimal expectations, our theoretical framework leaves policy-makers
free to decide whether to take a more. pro-choice or anti-abortion position. Their decision is restricted only by the limitations specified
throughout the article.
Admittedly, the theoretical framework for abortion policy that we
have developed and presented here will not satisfy everyone. Nor is
there ever likely to be such a framework. The more strident pro-choice
and anti-abortion advocates will particularly find our framework wanting. For in grounding it in classical liberalism, we explicitly reject fundamental arguments in these opposing viewpoints that cannot be defended or justified by this theory of government. For example, our
framework for abortion policy rejects the more ardent pro-choice argument that women have an absolute right to do with their bodies
whatever they please. We equally dismiss the anti-abortion argument
that the fetal-being is a child from the point of conception, therefore,
all abortions are murder. Since neither of these viewpoints develop
from this nation's constitutional tradition of classical liberalism, they
Published by eCommons, 1991
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cannot serve as the basis for accepting or rejecting a liberty interest in
the abortion decision or serve as the basis on which to build abortion
policy. Beyond the criticism our theoretical framework for abortion policy is likely to generate, we also recognize and caution that it is a preliminary effort that does not try to address all the controversial issues
in the abortion debate. Nor may it ever be able to do so. For example,
it is unclear, at least to us, whether or not a classical liberal approach
to abortion policy allows for parental notification and,consent. Strong
50
arguments favoring both interpretations can be made.
Additionally, there are at least two important implications of our
framework for abortion policy that will eventually need to be addressed. First, by arguing that a classical liberal perspective seems to
require government to prohibit post-viability abortions, a woman's liberty interest in abortion is tied somewhat to the current state of medical science. Advances in medical science may someday result in the
fetal-being being viable from the point of conception through such
means as an artificial womb or fetal transplants.' 5' If this day would
actually arrive, what would become of a woman's liberty interest in the
abortion decision as understood by classical liberalism?
At least one commentator suggests that if medical science ever advances to where a fetal-being is viable from the point of conception or
some early stage of pregnancy, then approaches to abortion policy that
rely on the viability criterion must "do the right thing" and "accept the
'conservative' consequences of the viability criterion."1 52 Others suggest
that such medical advances would literally redefine the liberty interest
in abortion from one primarily concerned with procreation choices to
one in which the issue was a woman's right to control her own genetic
material.' 5 3
A second implication concerns our understanding of classical liberalism as it applies to recognition of a fetal-being's interest in life. To
assert, as we do, that a classical liberal approach to abortion policy
would appear to require government to prohibit most post-viability
abortions is to also recognize government's authority to control a woman's behavior after a certain stage in her pregnancy. It also makes
the government an advocate for the fetal-being's interest in life.150. See generally Ruth H. Axelrod, Whose Womb Is it Anyway, I1CARDOZO L. REV. 685
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If our classical liberal framework for abortion policy recognizes
the legitimacy of coercive government action against a woman who
seeks to abort a post-viability fetal-being, would this framework also
support and justify government regulation of the behavior of a pregnant woman who chooses childbirth over abortion, for the purpose of'
promoting the fetal-being's interest in life?"" Does a classical liberal
understanding of procreation liberty allow government to regulate such
behaviors as whether a willingly pregnant woman smokes or drinks or
engages in drug use during her pregnancy? If so, can government judge
and punish her accordingly and further decide that she has forfeited
her parental authority and then transfer ii to another? Finally, we recognize that our theoretical framework for abortion policy, in all likelihood, lacks an important ingredient. It is not politically practical. Our
framework asks and expects policy-makers to replace the emotions and
passions of the abortion debate with reasoned analysis; to replace what
is politically correct and expedient with what is constitutionally correct.
We are not so naive to believe either is likely to happen in the near
future.
Despite these issues that still remain to be addressed, we set forth
our framework for abortion policy because we believe it is correct and
workable. But equally important, we hope to stress that all public policies, not just abortion, should be formulated from a clear understanding of constitutional theory; of the constitutional limits on both what
government is permitted to do and the liberty individuals must have
protected. In short, a conscious constitutional level of analysis should
be the starting and ending point for the formulation and implementation of all public policies. As classical liberalism has long been recognized as the theory behind the Constitution's expression of rights and
liberty, policy-makers need to incorporate an understanding of this theory into public policies. Specifically, when applied to the abortion controversy, classical liberalism can produce a policy that is both constitutionally sound and resolves the clash of absolutes by allowing
government to be both pro-choice and anti-abortion. We believe that
the theoretical framework presented in this article is a workable yet
preliminary attempt to do just that.
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